Build the Mini-MBA — Eastbrook's Flagship Gamble

A four-round, advanced higher-education strategy simulation set inside the Office of Executive Education at Eastbrook Business School, an AACSB-accredited private university in New Jersey. The office is a self-funded auxiliary: it earns no tuition subsidy and must cover faculty stipends, marketing, and a 28% institutional overhead out of its own revenue, returning a binding USD 1.5M contribution to the provost. Three weeks before launch the legacy USD 9,500 Management Certificate is collapsing — pre-registration is down 41% to 165 seats against a fixed institutional target of 300 — while a venture-backed online rival, LearnLadder, has just launched a fully online Mini-MBA at USD 1,900, one-fifth of Eastbrook's price, and two anchor corporate accounts (USD 2.6M, 38% of revenue) are questioning value. Playing the Associate Dean across a six-week design window, you (1) DIAGNOSE the portfolio and the threat — choose the strategic job of the new Mini-MBA and name the one advantage LearnLadder structurally cannot copy; (2) DESIGN the curriculum and format — online, hybrid, or high-touch in-person — fixing module count, faculty mix, credential, and the fully-loaded cost-per-seat and cohort scale that each format implies; (3) PRICE under the enrollment constraint — set price across the USD 3,500 / 5,900 / 8,500 band, the corporate-vs-individual mix and discount, and the marketing/CAC spend that must fill 300 seats in six weeks while clearing the USD 1.5M contribution after 28% overhead; and (4) CHOOSE THE EXPANSION MODE for the zero-budget Singapore/Shanghai mandate — export online, local partner, fly-in faculty, or license — funding it from program contribution and setting a balanced 18-month scorecard. The math rewards a differentiated, scalable design priced to hit BOTH the 300-seat and the USD 1.5M contribution targets, a self-funding expansion, and a balanced scorecard — and punishes the five classic errors: matching the rival's price into a margin trap, buying enrollment with deep corporate discounts that miss contribution, gold-plating a 25-seat fly-in flagship that cannot scale, choosing an unfunded expansion mode, and a one-number enrollment-only scorecard that ignores satisfaction and reach. Final KPIs track Enrollment vs the 300 target, Contribution (USD M) vs the USD 1.5M commitment, Differentiation/NPS, and Reach.